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In previous work (Hand 2003; Hand and White 2004) I have argued that the only adequate 
justification for compulsory religious education in schools is what I call the ‘possibility-of-
truth case’: 
 
Pupils should be given opportunities to consider religious propositions, and be 
equipped to make informed, rational judgments on their truth or falsity, on the grounds 
that some of those propositions may in fact be true. Religions make claims about the 
world with far-reaching implications for the way life should be lived; if there is a 
genuine possibility that some of those claims are true, it is arguable that pupils have a 
right to be made aware of them and provided with the wherewithal to evaluate them. 
(Hand 2003, 161) 
 
Justifying compulsory religious education in this way has some important implications for the 
aims and content of the subject. It implies that religious education will not be primarily 
concerned with imparting bodies of knowledge about religious institutions, texts and 
practices, or with cultivating empathetic understanding of other people’s religious views, or 
with inviting reflection on morally edifying narratives in religious literature (though it is 
likely to retain these as secondary concerns). Rather, the foremost task of religious education 
will be to ensure that pupils understand the meaning of religious propositions and can 
evaluate the evidence and argument bearing on the question of their truth. Attention will be 
given to arguments for and against the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and life 
after death; to reports of miracles and private religious experiences and their evidential 
weight; to the appeal of comprehensive doctrines or worldviews and the criteria by which 
they might be assessed; and to different forms of textual authority and their justifying 
grounds. Crucially, the possibility-of-truth case for religious education implies that pupils will 
be actively encouraged to question the religious beliefs they bring with them into the 
classroom and to judge for themselves which religious or irreligious view is the most 
plausible. 
 
My focus here will be on another argument for compulsory religious education that bears 
some striking similarities to the possibility-of-truth case. According to this argument, pupils 
have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and 
equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. Different paths make different 
demands on those who follow them and, because people are differently constituted, the 
demands of any given path will be more burdensome to some than to others. People cannot 
flourish if they are following a path that is unduly burdensome to them, so a central task of 
education is to enable pupils to find and follow paths that allow them to flourish. What 
justifies compulsory religious education, then, is the interest people have in knowing what 
religious and irreligious paths are available and being able to choose between them. I will call 
this the ‘religious choice case’.  
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Notwithstanding the similarities between the religious choice case and the possibility-of-truth 
case, my view is that they are fundamentally different and that only the latter succeeds. In 
what follows I try to explain why. 
 
 
The religious choice case 
 
In a recent essay Harry Brighouse makes the religious choice case for religious education in 
the course of defending personal autonomy as a basic educational aim: 
 
Children have a right to the opportunity to make and act on well-informed and well-
thought-out judgments about how to live their own lives. The animating idea behind 
the goal is that, for human beings to enjoy a good life, they have to find a way of life 
that is suited to their particular personalities. Think about religious choice. Some 
people may flourish brilliantly within the constraints laid down by Roman 
Catholicism, but others may find that those constraints make it impossible to live well. 
We make our choices about whether to be Roman Catholics based on a judgment of fit 
between the chosen life and ourselves; the better the fit, the better we flourish. But it is 
important that we have knowledge about other religious views and nonreligious views 
because, for some (those who cannot flourish within Catholicism), flourishing will 
depend on being able to adopt alternatives. Not only do we need knowledge of the 
alternatives, we also need the self‐knowledge, habits of mind, and strength of 
character to make the appropriate alternative choices. (Brighouse 2009, 36) 
 
Personal autonomy should be a basic aim of education because we significantly improve 
people’s prospects of flourishing by giving them the knowledge and independence of mind to 
choose ways of life that suit them. Autonomy is particularly important in the area of religion 
because, for some people, the constraints of the religious tradition in which they are raised 
‘make it impossible to live well’. So an education for personal autonomy will necessarily 
include a form of religious education in which pupils acquire both ‘knowledge about other 
religious views and nonreligious views’ and ‘the self-knowledge, habits of mind, and strength 
of character to make the appropriate alternative choices’. 
 
Brighouse identifies two further areas in which it is important to cultivate personal autonomy: 
work and sexual relationships. People are more likely to flourish if they are in jobs and 
relationships that fulfil them; and they are more likely to end up in fulfilling jobs and 
relationships if they are in a position to make independent and well-informed occupational 
and sexual choices. Just as people must be free to choose religious traditions other than the 
ones they are raised in, so they must be free to choose forms of employment and types of 
sexual relationship other than the ones their families push them towards. The religious choice 
case for compulsory religious education is, then, an exact analogue of the occupational choice 
case for compulsory careers education and the sexual choice case for compulsory sex 
education. 
 
Brighouse is not the first to articulate the religious choice case. An early statement of it is 
found in the 1971 Department for Education and Science report Prospects and Problems for 
Religious Education. The authors write: 
 
religious education, seen as an introduction to the religious dimension of life, to the 
faiths and philosophies with which man has faced the human situation, has a very 
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strong claim to a place in the curriculum, both because of the importance to man’s 
history and development of the themes with which it deals, and because the pupil 
needs such knowledge to enable him to choose his own way of life for himself. (DfES 
1971, 56, my italics) 
 
Basil Singh also advances a version of the argument in his defence of the ‘phenomenological 
approach’ to religious education (Singh 1986). Singh’s premise is ‘the basic notion that the 
pupil’s education must assist his task of choosing responsibly and selecting critically between 
the available possibilities within a pluralist society’ (240). Given this premise, the fact that 
‘religious education can play a part in bringing about the choice of an informed and intelligent 
life stance’ (ibid.) counts strongly in favour of its inclusion in the curriculum. 
 
Notwithstanding these examples, it is fair to say that the religious choice case does not enjoy 
widespread support among religious education theorists in the UK. While most recognise that 
the legal requirement on English schools to provide religious education for all pupils stands in 
need of justification, few are tempted by the justificatory thought that children must be 
equipped to choose responsibly between religions. While, in the end, I agree that this is not 
the right way to justify compulsory religious education, I also think there is a tendency among 
religious education theorists to dismiss it too quickly and for the wrong reasons.  
 
 
Choice and taste 
 
The most familiar objection to the religious choice case is that it reduces religion to a matter 
of taste. It assumes that people choose their religious beliefs in roughly the same way as they 
choose their breakfast cereals: they browse the products on display and select the one that 
most appeals to them. Robert Jackson describes the worry as follows: 
  
The perception of members of certain religious groups is that schools encourage 
children to be a ‘law unto themselves’ in matters of religion and values. Children, it is 
alleged, are encouraged to choose beliefs and values rather in the manner of selecting 
cans of beans or fruit from the shelves of a supermarket. (Jackson 2004, 28) 
 
To think of religions as analogous to food products, and religiously plural societies as 
analogous to supermarkets, is, of course, to trivialise them. It is to underestimate the 
significance of religion in people’s lives, the intimate connections between religious belief 
and personal identity, and the difficulty and upheaval of conversion from one religious view 
to another. The point about supermarket choice is that very little turns on it: it really doesn’t 
matter whether one chooses tinned peaches or tinned pears. We allow such choices to be 
governed by taste precisely because we think them unimportant. (And the moment we stop 
thinking them unimportant is the moment we stop using taste as the criterion for making 
them: if meat is murder, the fact that I prefer hamburgers to veggie burgers has no bearing on 
my choice between them.) 
 
The trivialisation of religion associated with the idea of religious choice is expertly satirised 
by Woody Allen in the film Hannah and Her Sisters (Allen 1986). Allen’s character, Mickey, 
is plagued by hypochondria and existential angst and decides to try out some different 
religions in the hope of alleviating his discomfort. He begins, to the horror of his Jewish 
parents, with Roman Catholicism, selected for its beauty and structure (or, at least, the beauty 
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and structure of its ‘against-school-prayer, pro-abortion, anti-nuclear wing’). When 
Catholicism fails to satisfy him, he turns his attention to the Hare Krishna movement: 
 
KRISHNA LEADER:  What makes you interested in becoming a Hare Krishna? 
MICKEY:  Well, I'm not saying that I want to join or anything, but… I know you guys 
believe in reincarnation, you know, so it interests me.  
KRISHNA LEADER:  Yeah, well, what's your religion?  
MICKEY:  Well, I was born Jewish, you know, but last winter I tried to become a 
Catholic and... it didn’t work for me. I studied and I tried and I gave it everything, but, 
you know, Catholicism for me was die now, pay later, you know. And I just couldn't 
get with it. And I, and I wanted to, you know.  
KRISHNA LEADER:  You're afraid of dying?  
MICKEY:  Well...yeah, naturally. Aren't you? Let me ask you, reincarnation, does that 
mean my soul would pass to another human being, or would I come back as a moose 
or an aardvark or something? 
 
What Allen exposes in these scenes is the travesty of construing religions as objects of 
consumer choice. Mickey tries out new religions in the way most of us try out new 
restaurants, declining to go back when they are not quite to his taste. His conversion from 
Judaism to Catholicism is scuppered by his inability to make the transition from rye bread and 
mustard to Wonder Bread and Hellmann’s Mayonnaise. And his decision about the Hare 
Krishna movement is made, in the end, on tonsorial and sartorial grounds: ‘Who are you 
kidding? You’re gonna be a Krishna? You’re gonna shave your head and put on robes and 
dance around at airports?’. Anyone trying to choose between religions in the way Mickey 
does has badly misunderstood what they are about.  
 
The worry that choice trivialises religion is, I think, the chief reason for wariness among 
theorists about the religious choice case for compulsory religious education. But it is a bad 
reason. It is a bad reason because taste is not the only choice-making criterion. From the claim 
that people should be equipped to choose between the religious and irreligious paths open to 
them, it does not follow that they should be taught to choose, or even that they are likely to 
end up choosing, on the basis of taste. To the contrary, an important early step in any serious 
attempt to equip people for religious choice will be to differentiate it from consumer choice: it 
is precisely not a matter of browsing rival belief systems and selecting the most appealing. 
 
Recall what Brighouse says about our religious choices. They are made, he says, on the basis 
of ‘a judgment of fit between the chosen life and ourselves’. To make such choices well it is 
not enough for us to have knowledge of the religious options available: we must also have 
self-knowledge. We need to know ourselves deeply enough and clearly enough to be able to 
recognise that certain kinds of demand will be too onerous for us to bear, certain expectations 
so stifling as to prevent our flourishing. We must understand that there are facts about the way 
we are constituted, about our most basic orientations, inclinations and affiliations, that fit us 
well for some religious paths and poorly for others. The task of choosing a religion involves 
thinking hard about who we are and about our capacity to lead good lives as members of 
different religious and irreligious communities. 
 
Again, occupational choice and sexual choice are helpful analogues. We do not choose our 
careers in the way we choose our socks. Rather we spend our formative years finding out 
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what we are good at, what we enjoy doing and what we want out of life. And we try to match 
this understanding of ourselves with an understanding of the range of employment 
opportunities realistically available to us. Similarly, decisions about whether to form sexual 
relationships with people of the same sex or the opposite sex or both, or whether to form 
many or few or no sexual relationships, and whether simultaneously or serially, are decisions 
properly based on self-knowledge, on understanding of social norms, expectations and 
prejudices, and on ethical reflection about what it is to live well and treat others well. It is 
because these choices are difficult, complex and important, because we do not think of them 
as matters of taste, that most of us support programmes of careers education and sex 
education in schools.  
 
To make a choice is simply to select something from a range of possibilities. There are many 
kinds of choice and many ways of making them. Supermarket choice, selection from a range 
of products on the basis of personal taste, is not paradigmatic of choice generally. So the 
religious choice case for compulsory religious education cannot fairly be rejected on the 
grounds that choosing between religions somehow trivialises them. 
 
 
Choice and belief 
 
There is, nevertheless, a problem with the religious choice case, and it is a serious one. There 
is a very important respect in which religions are quite unlike careers and sexual relationships. 
At the core of what it is to have a religion is the holding of certain beliefs – about the 
transcendent, the supernatural or the spiritual, about the beginning or the end of the world, 
about gods, avatars, angels or demons, about the immortality, incarnation or liberation of the 
soul, about sin, sacrifice, salvation or redemption. The differences between the followers of 
different religious and irreligious paths are fundamentally differences of belief: the followers 
assent to different propositions about what the world is like. That is not the case with people 
who work in different fields or form different types of sexual relationship. What distinguishes 
a barrister from a barista, or a physician from a physicist, is not adherence to a creed; nor is 
this what distinguishes people in same-sex and opposite-sex relationships, or in open and 
closed ones. 
 
The core cognitive dimension of religion is problematic for the religious choice case because 
there is something awry with the notion of choosing beliefs. It assumes we can exercise direct 
control over what we believe. But our beliefs are not so much things we do as things that 
happen to us; they are one of the ways in which the world impresses itself upon us, not one of 
the ways in which we impress ourselves upon the world. We believe what we do because of 
how things strike us, and how things strike us is not usually of our choosing.  
 
Direct doxastic voluntarism (the view that we have direct control over our beliefs) has come 
under heavy fire from philosophers over the last few decades. Here is William Alston’s well-
known argument against it: 
 
I shall merely contend that we are not so constituted as to be able to take up 
propositional attitudes at will. My argument for this, if it can be called that, simply 
consists in asking you to consider whether you have any such powers. Can you, at this 
moment, start to believe that the United States is still a colony of Great Britain, just by 
deciding to do so? If you find it too incredible that you should be sufficiently 
motivated to try to believe this, suppose that someone offers you $500,000,000 to 
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believe it, and you are much more interested in the money than in believing the truth. 
Could you do what it takes to get that reward?... It seems clear to me that I have no 
such power. Volitions, decisions or choosings don’t hook up with anything in the way 
of propositional attitude inauguration, just as they don’t hook up with the secretion of 
gastric juices or cell metabolism. (Alston 1988, 263) 
 
Alston’s claim is not that believing at will is logically impossible. We can imagine beings 
who are so constituted as to be able to take up propositional attitudes at will, beings who 
can see quite plainly that grass is green and yet choose to believe that it is blue. But we 
are not beings of that kind. It is psychologically impossible for us, or at least for most of 
us most of the time, to believe whatever we want. We form beliefs about how things are 
on the basis of how they seem to be, not on the basis of how we would like them to be. 
Because things are not always as they seem, our beliefs are often mistaken; and because 
things seem different to different people, we often disagree; but our propensity to error 
and disagreement attests only to the gap between appearance and reality, not to a capacity 
for forming beliefs at will.  
 
The picture Brighouse paints of autonomous individuals choosing between religions on 
the basis of judgments of fit is therefore badly distorted. People do not convert from one 
religion to another, or lose their faith, because they find a way of life better suited to their 
personalities. They convert, or lose their faith, because the view they previously held no 
longer seems credible to them, because the world now strikes them differently from the 
way it struck them before. Far from being choices, made with a view to harmonising self 
and life stance, conversions and apostasies are often involuntary, unwanted and 
detrimental to flourishing. Converts to conservative forms of Christianity or Islam may 
find themselves committed to standards of conduct quite at odds with their personal 
wants and needs; those who lose their faith may be in permanent mourning for the 
tradition and community that once sustained them. In religion, as in other areas of life, 
changes of belief are rarely under our direct control and cannot generally be said to make 
our lives better. 
 
The religious choice case for compulsory religious education fails, then, because people 
do not choose their beliefs. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive 
dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. Religious 
education cannot be justified on the grounds that children in plural societies must be 
equipped for religious choice.  
 
From the claim that we do not have direct control over our religious and irreligious 
views, however, it does not follow that we have no control over them, or that we have no 
responsibility for them. To the contrary, there is much we can do to improve our beliefs 
on religious matters and good reason to do it. We can and should exercise indirect control 
over our religious beliefs by attending as closely and as carefully as we can to relevant 
evidence and argument, to the full range of considerations bearing on the question of their 
truth. We cannot choose our religious beliefs, but we can choose how hard to think about 
them, how critically to examine their grounds, how open-mindedly to consider contrary 
views and alternative perspectives. This sort of rational scrutiny will often result in things 
coming to look different from the way they looked before, and thus in changes to our 
beliefs on religious matters. The new beliefs are no more likely to be suited to our 
personalities than the old ones; but they are more likely to be true. And it is because we 
all have an interest in holding true beliefs, especially on matters of significant practical 
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import, that we have good reason to exercise this sort of indirect control over our 
religious and irreligious views.  
 
Here, then, is the crux of the difference between the religious choice case and the 
possibility-of-truth case. The former mistakenly assumes that beliefs can be changed at 
will and proposes that children be equipped to choose the religious beliefs that best suit 
their personalities. The latter recognises that the control we have over our beliefs is 
usually only indirect, a matter of choosing whether and how closely to examine their 
grounds, and proposes that children be equipped to conduct such examinations as 
competently and carefully as possible. 
 
 
Steps of faith 
 
Someone who broadly accepts the philosophical critique of direct doxastic voluntarism, 
who agrees that it is not usually psychologically possible for us to believe at will, might 
nevertheless hold that religious beliefs are exceptions to the rule. A distinguishing feature 
of religious beliefs, such a person might argue, is precisely their volitional basis: religious 
beliefs are characteristically acquired by consciously chosen steps of faith. Religion, on 
this view, is the one area of life in which beliefs are things we do rather than things that 
happen to us.  
 
This objection deserves to be taken seriously. Talk of steps or leaps of faith is by no 
means uncommon in religious contexts, and the metaphors of stepping and leaping 
certainly seem to suggest acts of believing over which people exercise direct control. 
Some consideration of this phenomenon is needed before the religious choice case for 
religious education can be safely dismissed. 
 
Perhaps the first point to make is that many sincere religious believers report nothing 
resembling a step or leap of faith. They are persuaded of the truth of their religious beliefs 
in roughly the same ways as they are the persuaded of the truth of their scientific, 
historical and psychological beliefs: by the testimony of trusted others, acquaintance with 
supporting evidence and argument, coherence with intuitions and other beliefs, etc. Their 
experience of coming to religious faith, or of progressing from an unreflective to a 
considered faith, is no more one of choosing or leaping than their experience of coming 
to believe that human beings evolved from more primitive species, or that the causes of 
human behaviour sometimes lie in repressed desires and impulses. Steps of faith are 
certainly not necessary to religious belief and may not be particularly common. It is 
possible that they are a rather local and recent feature of Protestant Christianity, a legacy 
of Kierkegaard and existentialist accounts of the human situation. 
 
A second point is that steps of faith, as ordinarily understood, are very unlike the sort of 
religious choices described by Brighouse. The anomic unbeliever who leaps into the arms 
of God is not making a prudential judgment about the way of life best suited to her 
personality. Her decision is not the end result of a series of cost-benefit analyses and self-
life-stance compatibility tests. It is striking that the example of religious choice Brighouse 
gives is of someone exiting Roman Catholicism to escape its constraints – a move in the 
opposite direction from those we might be tempted to describe as steps of faith.  
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How, then, should we understand the notion of a step of faith? I suggest that the idea is 
naturally at home in a rather specific set of epistemic circumstances. Sometimes in life 
we find ourselves confronted with rival views, theories or hypotheses and insufficient 
evidence to say which of them is right. Usually, in such situations, our response is to 
reserve judgment, to remain agnostic until such time as more evidence comes to light. 
But suppose that, for a given epistemic agent, two further conditions obtain. First, the 
available evidence, while insufficient to settle the matter, nevertheless seems to support 
one view better than it supports the others. Second, indefinite agnosticism is in some way 
costly: perhaps, for example, the matter under dispute strikes one as so important, so 
significant for the conduct of life, that reserving judgment feels like an evasion of 
responsibility or a failure to face up to an existential demand. It may be that an epistemic 
agent for whom these two conditions are satisfied is able to choose between agnosticism 
and acceptance of the best supported view. Perhaps, in these specific circumstances, we 
really can decide for ourselves whether to withhold belief on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence or commit ourselves to whichever religious or irreligious view seems most 
likely to be true. 
 
If this is right, direct doxastic voluntarism is not wholly false. While it is normally the 
case that believing at will is not psychologically possible for us, it sometimes is possible. 
Where we judge that the evidence for a claim is insufficient, that it nevertheless supports 
the claim better than any alternative, and that reserving judgment is problematic, we can 
choose whether or not to believe the claim. We can go beyond what is warranted by the 
evidence and believe by faith. (Note that we are concerned here with what is 
psychologically possible, not with what is ethically responsible. I leave open the question 
of whether there is room in a defensible ethics of belief for steps of faith as I have 
characterised them.) 
 
But I do not think any of this helps the religious choice case. In plural societies people 
hold a wide variety of religious and irreligious views, and schools certainly have a role in 
equipping children to respond appropriately to that variety. But responding appropriately 
is not a matter of choosing the view that best fits one’s personality. It is a matter of 
subjecting each view to critical scrutiny, of investigating the relevant evidence and 
argument with an open mind, of trying to discover the truth. The hope is not that children 
will determine their own beliefs, but that they will let their beliefs be determined by the 
evidence. Choice does not come into the question of whether it is Christianity or 
Buddhism, Islam or Confucianism, pantheism or atheism, that enjoys the strongest 
argumentative support or tells the most plausible story about the human condition. If 
there is, for some of us, a choice to be made at the end of our religious inquiries between 
reserving judgment and accepting the best supported view, that fact should not be 
ignored; but nor should its significance be exaggerated. The hardest part of the journey, 
and the part for which education can do most to prepare us, is the search for the best 
supported view.  
 
Granting the possibility of voluntaristic steps of faith, then, offers no reprieve for the 
religious choice case. Only the possibility-of-truth case is adequate to the task of 
justifying compulsory religious education in schools. The basic question about religion 
children must be encouraged to ask and equipped to answer is not ‘Which, if any, of these 
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